


Theme III 2a: Bosnian War (1992-1995)



There were Serbs who stabbed her in the stomach, cut her open and took two small children out of her stomach and then beat them to death on the ground.

Testimony of Ramiza Gurdić²

¹ <https://time.com/3787440/bosnia/>

² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srebrenica_massacre#Rape_and_abuse_of_civilians

Key Concepts

1. Peace
 - a. Absence of War
 - b. Interests of different parties catered to without the need to resort to war
 2. Peace Enforcement
 - a. Use of military force to impose a peace on belligerents
 3. Peace Building
 - a. Reduces risk of lapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels of conflict management and lay the foundation for sustainable peace
 4. Cooperation
 - a. State and non-state actors adjust their behaviour to the anticipated or actual preferences of others through policy coordination
 - b. Exhibited by
 - i. Participating in peace negotiations
 - ii. A few actors allying themselves against a greater common enemy
 5. Conflict
 - a. Incompatible or competitive interests, hence countries strive to reduce the gains available to other states or impede their achievements
 - b. Attributed to divergence in political security, economic or ideological interests
-

Causes (Ethnic and Religious Nationalism)

1. After Tito's death, competing ethnic nationalism gained strength as they were able to provide a sense of kinship and shared beliefs. However, they also divided the Yugoslavians along ethnic nationalist lines, resulting in different population groups viewing each other as enemies.
 - a. Milosevic rose to power on a platform of extreme Serbian nationalism. Calling for the expansion of Serbia into Bosnia. In 1988, he identified the Bosnians as an internal enemy, directly antagonising the Bosnian Muslims and fuelling tension in Bosnia between the Bosniaks, the government and their supporters.
 - b. Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) launched a nationalistic campaign rallying for a "Greater Croatia" that included Croat-Majority areas in Bosnia as well as played up the imagined barbaric nature of Serbs. **By dehumanising Serbs and reducing them to inhumane, the propensity for Croats to empathise, much less see Serbs as fellow countrymen is greatly reduced. Generating hate.**
2. Religion played a role in motivation and justification of violence tied to ethno-nationalism of their perpetrators that justified the need for brutality to defend their faith and bring about a new social and political order.
 - a. Slavic differences reinforced by the split in the Christian Church with the Croats identifying with Roman Catholicism and Serbs, Greek-Orthodox. **A legacy of struggle**

and longstanding animosity was also imported into the perception that both ethnic groups viewed each other. Reinforcing an already negative perception.

- b. Croat Catholics campaigned for Stepinac's canonisation due to his opposition to the Yugoslav communists attempts to control the church while the Serbs hated him for his suspected support of the Croatian Nazi government and failure to take a strong stance in defence of those prosecuted by the Nazis.

Causes (Economic Interests)

1. Regional imbalances fueled resentment and competition between republics as economic models adopted became increasingly divergent. This resulted in economic nationalism and controversy that one republic was being exploited by other republics, fuelling resentment.
 - a. Richer Croatia supported economic reforms and pushed for greater marketisation due to stronger private sectors while the Serbs were more resistant to market reforms due to stronger focus on heavy industries. **Contradicting economic interests that fuelled economic nationalism as the unifying federal system weakened, resulting in one republic becoming more economically independent from the other, fracturing the country further.**
 - b. Serbian Memorandum accused Yugoslav economic policies of intentionally plunging Serbia into economic backwardness. Feeling that it was continuously discriminated within Yugoslavia economically, this fuelled Serbia's vengeance and indignation.
2. IMF structural adjustment policies shifted Yugoslav's command economy to market-based too quickly. Spurred by a desire to safeguard its assets from market forces, different republics called for self-determination, increasing nationalistic sentiments.
 - a. IMF required expenditure cuts amounting to 5% of GDP, preventing the federal government from having access to credits from its own rental banks. The freezing of transfer payments to republics invoked anger of the republics to the central government as their budgetary process and financial ability froze, thus further fracturing the cohesiveness of the state.
 - b. IMF forced governments to stop funding "loss-making enterprises". This resulted in 900 enterprises closing and over half a million workers laid off. The spike in unemployment alarmed the Serbian and Bosnian governments with anger on the streets due to the unemployment being attributed to the federal government.

Causes(Domestic Politics)

1. Political elites used nationalism to mobilise considerable sections of the population to strengthen their respective positions, radicalising their political struggle. Propaganda and populist messages hardened the stance of each side against the other, making them less willing to compromise.
 - a. Serb extremists wielded propaganda reminding their compatriots of the Croatian Vataša and demanded reductions in autonomy of certain states to revive Serbian dominance. Increasing hatred of the Serbian people against the Croats.
 - b. Croatian nationalists used Serbian Chetniks, anti-communists who supported both the Nazi and allies to wage planned Serbian uprisings in Bosnia. **This increased the**

suspicion of Croats towards the Serbian people, promoting distrust as well as drive fragmentation due to them being inflammatory remarks.

2. Although Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia divided political power equically, power sharing arrangement proved unstable as tensions increased. Equal power sharing evolved into a competition for influence through competing political views.
 - a. Although the Muslim party of the Democratic Action's Izetbegovic committed to a multinational state pushed for Bosnian independence from Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia.
 - b. Republik Srpska, with Milosevic's aid, established a JNA army in Bosnia by transferring Bosnian-born soldiers into Republic Srpska and with support from the Arkan Tigers. **The availability of an army meant that the serb government could now easily resort to force as a threat, increasing mistrust and tension.**

Bosnian War (1992-1995) (With US and NATO involvement)

Republika Srpska

1. Protraction

- a. Engaged in ethnic cleansing against its opponents that created much resentment from other actors, along ethnic lines prompting stronger responses.
 - i. VRS carried out an ethnic cleansing campaign against Bosniaks and Croats in Prijedor. So violent that only 1/10 Bosniaks and 1/2 Serbs remained.
 - ii. Srebrenica Massacre saw Yugoslav Serbs commit ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica, 8000 Bosniaks killed, mostly civilian men and boys.
- b. Resorted to violence that only prolonged the war as its strategies elicited greater focus and commitment
 - i. VRS under Ratko Miladic used shelling and sniping to target the civilian population and institutions in order to capture Sarajevo against 700,000 Bosnians. (Sniper Street). Killed around 14,000.
 - ii. Markale massacres when the VRS launched a mortar shell into the centre of a market place, killing 68 in response to increased cooperation between Bosniaks and Bosnians Croats, prompting greater multilateral involvement against the Bosnian Serbs.

2. Conflict Management

- a. Rejected and refused to compromise during peace processes through attempted subversion, engendered distrust that increased challenges for a peace treaty to be signed and prolonged without any chances of a ceasefire.
 - i. Although Republika Srpska signed the Vance-Owen Plan, it purposely held a sham referendum that depicted the Bosnian Serb population refusing the agreement, thus leaving the government no choice but to abandon it. **The veneer of peace to stall the conflict and avoid concessions only bought extra time for its military**
 - ii. Rejected Contact Group's 51/49% territorial division as it implied abandoning the ideal of a "Greater Serbia" by guaranteeing Bosnian territorial integrity.

Placing the political ambition of an extremist government over peace in the Balkan region.

- b. Accepted peace attempts that prevented the war from escalating and continuing.
 - i. Accepted Yeltsin's proposal to withdraw treaty weapons to positions 20km from Sarajevo and stopped daily shelling at Sarajevo, **this prevented NATO from needing to follow up on its ultimatum of airstrikes, preventing further multilateral involvement that will only expand the war.**
 - ii. Despite initial rejection, Karadzic ultimately signed the Dayton Accords after Milosevic's pressure that ended the Bosnian war due to Serbia's political leverage on the Bosnian Serbs

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia

1. Protraction

- a. Engaged in ethnic cleansing and religion-inspired atrocity, panning the flames of hatred as part of its land grabs for dominance.
 - i. Ahmici Massacre 1993 saw HVO troops kill 116 Bosniaks including women and children before burning down houses and mosques.
 - ii. 1993 shelling of Mostar's 16th Century Ottoman Bridge as part of its wider efforts to force Muslims into the ancient Ottoman quarter and then shelled and besieged them (**Cultural Barbarism**)

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Protraction

- a. Muslim members of the Bosnian army attacked the Sertb Village north of Sarajevo, killing 30 people. 11 members of the Bosnian army were arrested on charges of war crimes, **the worse litigation handed out in Sarajevo (Might be incorrect)**
- b. Rejected the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan of proposed partition as seen as legitimising territorial gains made via ethnic cleansing and going against the aims of territorial integrity.

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

- 1. Protracted as the alliances against Serbia under the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation fell apart due to conflicting political aims. **The resulting Croat-Bosnian War resulted in Sporadic Conflicts**
- 2. Agreement ending hostilities signed in Washington established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and turned the 3-front conflict to a two-front one. **Joint operation against Serbia forced and altered the military balance against Serbia, placing pressure on Serbia.**

External State Actors

1. Serbia

- a. Serbia provided crucial financial backing and extensive military support and wherewithal to fight, enabling Republika Srpska to fight and commit its ethnic cleansing.

- i. A national bank was established in Republika Srpska in 1992 under the auspices of the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) to fund transfers. Almost 100% of the 1995 Republic Srpska war budget came from Yugoslav credits.
 - ii. Every Bosnian serb was transferred from the JNA to VRS, bringing equipment and expertise while the majority of the budget was for the VRS
- 2. **Croatia**
 - a. Croatia provided crucial financial backing and military support, enabling it the wherewithal to fight.
 - i. Croatia had significant influence within the HVO and provided such extensive arms that the ICTY ruled that Croatia had overall control of the HVO.
 - ii. Croatia financed the HVO from Croatia's state budget via its state-owned banks. 8 million were deposited into an account while millions to 2 others.
- 3. **Serbia**
 - a. Forced warring states to peace
 - i. When Karadzic rejected the 51/49% peace plan by the contact group due to nationalist ambitions, Milosevic cut economic ties with the Bosnian Serbs
 - ii. At Dayton, although Karadzic opposed, Milosevic supported the accord as it granted Bosnian Serbs autonomy and self governance over most of the territory. Serbia had political leverage to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into signing the accord.

Peacekeeping (UN and NATO)

- 1. Although the EU spearheaded early peace attempts, they were largely unsuccessful due to the lack of consensus from unwillingness to deepen involvement or attain superpower backing.
 - a. EU is not inclined to adopt overall military action so as not to suffer losses. It also did not favour airstrikes in fear of friendly-fire. **This emboldened the Serbs to carry on their offensive due to the lack of resolve.**
 - b. EU argued for the rights of minorities to self-determination. The Vance-Owen plan divided Bosnia into 10 semi-autonomous regions along ethnic lines but it was opposed by the Clinton administration as it was seen as appeasing the Serbs without any long-term solution.
- 2. UN diplomatic efforts produced far-reaching sanctions that crippled economic and military assets of Republika Srpska. With a handicapped military, they were unable to engage in full fledged conflict.
 - a. UNSC 787 imposed a widespread ban on shipments to and from Yugoslavia. **Bosniaks, who also relied to a small extent on the greater Muslim countries for aid were also cut off (1992) (Maybe inaccurate)**
 - b. 1994, in retaliation to the Bosnian Serbs obstructing the Contact Group's plan, the UNSC adopted Resolution 942, severing all commercial and monetary links as well as cutting the flow of fuel to the Bosnian Serbs, a critical blow against strategic military assets (heavy weaponry) that handicapped their war efforts.

3. UN's attempts at diplomatic efforts to mediate was sidelined by other international organisations and actors that proved more significant and they were also unable to get warring parties to agree stop fighting
 - a. The Vance-Owen plan divided Bosnia into 10 semi-autonomous regions along ethnic lines but it was opposed by the Clinton administration as it was seen as appeasing the Serbs without any long-term solution.
 - b. Contact Group formalised participation of the US and Russia in peace negotiations. It was also involved in shuttle diplomacy and established basic principles that acted as a prelude to the settlement, sidelining the UN and EU's efforts.
4. UNPROFOR acted as a stronger deterrent and increasing involvement by acting as a bugger between warring parties and monitoring ceasefire negotiations.
 - a. 1995 provided better protection for the UN troops via the introduction of a rapid reaction force (including French, British and Dutch soldiers) and redeployment of existing troops to less vulnerable regions, resisting calls to withdraw due to concerns over troop safety as a withdrawal was politically unacceptable.
 - b. 1994 and 1995, monitored implementation between Bosnian government and Bosnian Croats and between Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serbs respectively.

US

1. Mediation

- a. Initially distant, resulting in little action against the war, it was eventually unable to attain a consensus between 3rd party actors due to a divergence in preferred approach and respective political interests.
 - i. Preferred to abstain from direct engagement and preferred European involvement due to fear of the war becoming another "Vietnam", resulting in the Clinton administration adopting a "wait and see approach"
 - ii. "Lift and Strike" Strategy under Clinto proposed lifting arms embargo on Bosnia for Bosnian government to defend itself and use airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. Opposed by France and Britain as it risked the safety of NATO troops and Opposed by Russia as well due to its support of Bosnia
- b. Eventually played a major role in establishing peace agreements that accelerated the resolution of the war as it adequately addressed warring state's concerns
 - i. Leading role as a mediator between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks. Encouraged Tudjman's compliance by offering economic aid to rebuild the Croatian economy. Culminated in the Washington Agreement that created Muslim-Croat Federation and ended the Croat-Bosniak War.
 - ii. National Security Advisor Lake made visits to other Contact Group members to outline jey points for the peace plan while Holbrooke negotiated with Balkan Leaders. Shuttle diplomacy laid the foundations for principles for a settlement (Dayton).

- c. Although much heavier involvement after the Markale massacre diplomatically in the form of the Contact Group to deliver a unified mandate, the group was unable to agree on important issues. Any attempted peace treaty failed
 - i. Could not stand together on important issues such as sanctions, arms embargoes, support for UNPROFOR and the threat to use military force, **resulting in little headway in brokering peace as well as damaged credibility**
 - ii. 51/49 failure

Russia

1. Mediation and Peacekeeping

- a. Initial cooperation with Western powers through UN institutions demonstrating a break in Cold War opposition to Western initiatives.
 - i. Russia supported UNSC Resolution 757 to impose trade embargoes and financial sanctions on Yugoslavia
 - ii. Approved UNPROFOR's activity in Bosnia as intervention to protect civilian population from human rights abuse. Secured Sarajevo's airports for humanitarian aid, delivered humanitarian relief throughout no flight and safe zones.
- b. Vociferously opposed to what it deemed as unjustified violence inspired by western ambition.
 - i. Rejected US proposal for NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs in response to Markale massacre due to what it believed to be NATO's attempt to stay relevant after the cold war, resulting in its reluctance to allow NATO a role above enforcing a no-fly zone.
 - ii. RUSSBAT received a categorical directive from Russia not to execute any order from UN command to redeploy

NEEDS MORE DETAIL ON NATO MILITARY OPERATIONS.

MESSY

Theme III 2a: The Congo Crisis

[1]

“We are no longer your monkeys.”

-Patrice Lumumba, shouting during the Speech of King Baudoin at the Ceremony of the Proclamation of the Congo's Independence in Leopoldville on June 30, 1960

I proclaim in the name of the nation the birth of the Republic of Congo!

-Joseph Kasavubu in his speech at the Ceremony of the Proclamation of the Congo's Independence in Leopoldville on June 30, 1960

<u>Key Concepts</u>	
1. Peace: The determining factor to evaluate the effectiveness of conflict management	
	a. Absence of War
	b. Interest of different actors to be proactively catered to without the need of resorting to conflict
2. Cooperation	
	a. State and non-state actors adjust their behaviour to the anticipated or actual preferences of others through policy coordination
	b. Exhibited by
	i. Participation in peace negotiations and processes
	ii. A few actors allying themselves over a common enemy
3. Conflict	

- | |
|--|
| a. Actors have incompatible or competitive interests; hence they strive to reduce the gains available to other states or impede their achievements |
| b. Attributed to divergence in political, security, economic or ideological interests |

4. Conflict Development

- | |
|---------------------------------------|
| a. How different actors influence the |
| i. Outbreak |
| ii. Protraction |
| iii. End of conflict |

Domestic Actors

1. State

- | |
|--------------------|
| a. Patrice Lumumba |
| b. Joseph Kasavubu |

2. Non state

- | |
|---------------------------------|
| a. Mobutu Sese Seko (ANC) |
| b. Albert Kalonji (South Kasai) |
| c. Moise Tshombe (Katanga) |

Foreign Actors

1. Major Powers and External State Actors

- | |
|------------|
| a. USA |
| b. USSR |
| c. Belgium |

2. United Nations and Regional Organisations

- | |
|-------------------|
| a. United Nations |
|-------------------|

Causes of Conflict

1. **(Decolonisation Process)** Due to rioting, the Congolese independence process was pressured and rushed. Consequently, Belgium failed to adequately prepare the Congo for independence as Congo did not have a abled civil service and the country was still alien to self-governance.
 - a. The Congolese had not been educated for civil service leadership jobs with very few receiving higher education. Furthermore, as no political parties had been allowed, there were no experienced politicians. % Congolese attaining higher than a primary school education was only 0.5%. **The newly independent government was left with a vacuum of competent of civil servants and professionals.** The new government was dysfunctional.
 - b. The Belgians gambled that independence would purchase enough goodwill to retain a neo-colonial or neo-imperial presence in the country, expecting the bureaucracy, the army and the economy to remain in Belgium hands. **As such failed to set up apposite institutions for the newly independent government to govern through.**
2. **(Domestic Politics)**
 - a. Domestic politics saw different factions within the central government of Congo advocate for their own political interests, weakening the strengths of the central government to handle any instability after independence

- i. Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) and Alliance Des Bakongo (ABAKO) was a marriage of convenience. During the constitutional crisis, Kasavubu would blame Lumumba's insistence on centralism to be the cause of the South Kasai violence, dismissing him from Prime Minister. Lumumba refused and announced Kasavubu's dismissal. **This brought the government to a stalemate until Mobutu was able to exploit this to seize power. Pro Lumumba factions refused to accept Mobutu's rule and Congo was now ruled by rival governments**
 - ii. MNC was polarised between the more moderate faction advocating for a central Congo versus the more radical members who advocated for federalism. This split the party between MNC-Lumumba (MNC-L) and MNC-Kalonji (MNC-K). As MNC-K strived to deprive MNC-L of some of its most capable leaders and narrow its bases of support, **this factionalism compromised MNC's cohesion and thus their ability to govern**
- b. Domestic politics saw secessionist movements disagree with the central government on the way Congo should be ran, causing them to see political control as their way of deciding their own political affairs. This resulted in these movement's attempts to secede from the Congo, determining the Crisis to revolve around conflict between the Central Government and these secessionist provinces.
- i. Kalonji disagreed with Lumumba's goal of a unified Congo, advocating for a more radical ideal of federalism instead. This split led Kalonji to then declare South Kasai autonomous, prompting ANC to invade South Kasai. **Both sides couldn't see eye to eye, prompting Kalonji to rule by his own terms by seceding.**
 - ii. Tshombe's Confederation of Tribal Associations of Katanga (CONAKAT) party had allies and common economic interests with Belgians. This was antithetical to Lumumba's political preaching as Lumumba strived to break away from the shackles of colonialism (**Against Belgium settlers-Economic interests**) and CONAKAT wanted a loose federal system with strong regional power so that Tshombe can retain much power. (**Against Lumumba's strive towards centralism-Political interests**).

Divergence in political and economic interests prompted to Tshombe to declare Katanga independent.

3. **(Economic Interest)** Both Katanga and South Kasai housed many minerals that are lucrative mining adventures to foreign companies, translating into lucrative tax gains to these states. As such, both states sought to protect the tax revenues from Lumumba's plans to nationalise the mines to ensure a more egalitarian Congo. This served as an impetus for both states to secede.
 - a. The *Union Minière* whom controlled the copper-mining industry feared that Lumumba's possible plan to nationalise the Katangese mines would erode their economic state. 80% of Katanga's revenue came from mineral exports by foreign companies. **Hence to *Union Minière*, relinquishing this profitable industry was unthinkable while to Katanga, nationalisation would mean seeing a majority of its riches being redistributed.** Katanga's secession was encouraged while the Europeans hired mercenaries, **increasing tensions as there was now an armed resistance group against Lumumba**
 - b. Kalonji was intent on carrying on the economic partnership with Belgium Company Forminiere which was granted mining concessions in exchange for the portion of Forminiere's tax in the form of cash and diamond payments. **Kalonji had a vested personal interest in preventing the wealth generated from the lucrative diamond mines from being distributed evenly across Congo.**
4. **(Ethnic and Religious Nationalisms)**
 - a. The ethnic differences reinforced by the Belgians during colonial rule were once again accentuated by political parties which were ethnically or regionally focused. This fuelled fragmenting the Congo along ethnic lines and increasing tensions between the 200 ethnic groups.
 - i. The coalition government that dominated Lumumba's party had to content with over 50 different political groups representing different ethnic groups, making any kind of consensus difficult. The political situation was exacerbated when after independence, public order was threatened by the violent reaction of groups that felt themselves to have been excluded from the post-colonial settlement. **With so many political groups fighting for the interests of their own representation, Congo was ripened for violent clashes of interests while the government can be near paralysed as consensus was almost impossible.**
 - ii. ABAKO, representative of Bakongo interests clashed with the Bangala people whom they viewed as immigrants. Originally aiming to preserve

Bakongo language and culture, ABAKO placed culture and language at the forefront of their election campaign. This was opposed by the Bangalas whom a letter of recommendation to the Belgians, recommending that the elections should be devoid of any ethnic animosity. **ABAKO was antagonised as they perceived the Bangalas as unjustly hindering their attempts to preserve their culture after being diluted by Bangala immigrants.**

- b. During colonial rule, the Belgium administration would encourage immigration and colonial division, antagonising the indigenous population. After independence, political representatives would campaign along the lines of advocating these indigenous' population, eventually fuelling their motivations of greater autonomy.
 - i. When Baluba MNC-K obtained a majority, yet failed to take control of the provincial government, Lumumba exacerbated the animosity by promoting a Lulua candidate as the provincial president while Kalonji was offered the position of being in charge of agriculture. **This humiliated Kalonji and made the Baluba felt marginalised by both the Belgium administration and the independent government. Kaloni appealed to the Baluba majority that autonomy would ensure their safety, especially after they became subjects of violent attacks. Kalonji had enough support to declare South Kasai's autonomy.**
 - ii. Kasai Baluba consists of 38% of Katangese population as miners. As the indigenous Katangese viewed them as strangers, Tshombe rode on this as his CONAKAT was formed to protect the rights of native "Katangese" Along with the pragmatic financial reasons, Tshombe seceded from Congo and launched violent attacks on the Baluba people. **Tshombe, rode on demagoguery movements to garner support for secession as well as to justify violence against the Balubas, exacerbating ethnic tensions.**

The Congo Crisis (July 1960: Outbreak)

Outbreak of Conflict

1. **(Economic Interest, Domestic Politics: Belgium, Tshombe)** Soldiers of the *Force Publique* mutinied against their white Belgian commanders after their demands for a pay raise and Corp Africanisation was rejected. As the mutiny spread and widespread violence broke, Belgium troops

would intervene militarily to protect the European settlers and leverage this opportunity to support their economic interests, sparking the Congo Crisis.

- a. Reports that the Congolese troops had attacked Belgians triggered Belgium to intervene by sending 3000 paratroopers into major Congolese cities to secure the European quarters. **While ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens, Lumumba and Kasavubu believed that the Belgians were using this as a pre-text to recolonise Congo. Prompting them to resist Belgian military intervention to protect their sovereignty.**
- b. Tshombe took advantage of the armed mutiny to declare Katanga independent. Belgium, wanting to retain control over the lucrative copper mines against Lumumba's attempts to nationalise them, gave Tshombe covert military, technical assistance and a white mercenary force. **Belgium's assistance only protracted the conflict as this ensured that Katanga was militarily strong enough to maintain its independence for over 3 years.**

Resolution of Conflict

1. **(Competition for Influence: Lumumba, Kasavubu)** In response to Belgian intervention, Lumumba and Kasavubu would ask UN for military assistance to fend off what they perceived as Belgium aggression and subversion. Thus in the hopes of deterring further Belgian aggression and ensure their withdrawal, both sought to end the conflict
 - a. Both Lumumba and Kasavubu would send 2 telegrams to Dag Hammarskjöld to request military aid to protect against acts of aggression committed by Belgian troops. They would maintain their side as the victim by expressing suspicion that Belgium was behind Katanganese secession and stressed that attacks against Europeans occurred only after Belgian intervention. **As they did not request for UN assistance to restore the internal situation i.e. Get Katanga back, it was clear that both Lumumba and Kasavubu sought only to defend against Belgium's aggression.**
2. **(Conflict Mediation: UN)**
 - a. UNSC Resolution 143 established the UN Operations in the Congo (ONUC) just a few days after Katanga secession, authorising military assistance to the Congolese government. **In theory, ONUC was meant to supplement the government with technical assistance until the Congolese military was capable enough to resist Belgium's imperialist endeavours.**
 - b. Due to Cold War rivalry, agreement on ONMUC's mandate was more difficult than necessary. Hence ONUC's mandate was forced to be too broad and muddled, hampering it from carrying out its mission and forcing it to wave the flag of neutrality to balance the rivalry.
 - i. Hammarskjöld feared that any resolution that made explicit reference to Belgian

aggression would put the western powers in a position of having to condemn their NATO ally, prompting to US veto. **Without explicit reference to Belgian aggression, Belgium was not as diplomatically pressured as it should have been if it were labelled as the aggressor. No political impetus to hasten its withdrawal.** Belgian troops still remained in Katanga

- ii. Instead of a strong mandate, focusing on provision of technical assistance to the Congolese government and merely calling upon Belgium to withdraw without any mention of a deadline **meant that Congolese troops still face disadvantages against a stronger Belgium army and Belgium could leverage on this and the lack of a deadline to fulfil their objectives before pulling out when they see fit.** Belgian troops were still remained in Katanga

- 3. **(Support for UN: USA and USSR)** Both the USA and USSR harboured personal interests in supporting the UN resolution 143. The US sought a neutral UN to intervene to prevent the government from turning to the USSR for assistance while the USSR voted in favour to boost its image in the 3rd world.
 - a. After the USSR tested its first nuclear bomb in 1949, the nuclear race began. Hence despite the fading importance of Congolese uranium to the US, there were still concerns of USSR obtaining Congolese uranium, the Eisenhower administration thus supported the UN peace operation, hoping that its neutral stance would prevent Congolese requests for Soviet military assistance. **This reflected Cold war caution regarding Congo's mineral resources, illustrating how cold war dynamics forced the US to decline request for direct assistance and instead deliver aid through a neutral UN.**
 - b. The USSR chose to support the friendly Lumumba government and neutral UN involvement as it was anxious to not appear as obstructive to African states in the UNGA, which demanded immediate action. It also wanted to present itself as an anti-imperialist force against Belgium, aligning with the UN's objective of ensuring the withdrawal of Belgian troops (which were also NATO troops) **This approach gave the USSR a moral upperhand, allowing it to advance its strategic interest for influence in newly independent nations in Africa by portraying itself favourably while also ensuring that western elements (NATO) forces are out.**

The Congo Crisis (July 1960- February 1961: Under ONUC Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding)

Protraction of Conflict

1. (Belgium)

- a. Not wanting to be seen as an imperialist power, Belgium initially cooperated with the UN by supporting UN involvement and agreeing to adhere to resolution 143, allowing the situation in Congo to defuse and thus accelerating conflict resolution.
 - i. Belgian's direct military involvement drew international criticism especially from African nations. Many whom had recently gained independence themselves were particularly vocal in their criticism of Belgium actions whom they saw as a blatant example of neocolonialism. **Under pressure from the UN and international community, Belgium was forced to withdraw its troops.**
 - ii. The first contingent of Belgian forces left Leopoldville upon the arrival of UN troops and after assurances that UN contingents would arrive in sufficient numbers, Belgian authorities agreed to withdraw all their forces.[2] **This illustrates the motive for Belgium presence in Leopoldville which was to protect its citizens. Once the UN was able to fulfill the role, Belgium forces withdrew with reasonable speed.**
- b. **(Economic Interests: Belgium)** There were tensions between Belgium and UN over issues such as the use of force and protection of Belgium commercial mining interests in the Congo, causing mediation between the UN and Belgium to yield little success, resulting in the continued presence of Belgian elements, protracting the conflict.
 - i. Once ONUC's primary objective was just to see the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo, Belgian authorities knew that should Belgium completely withdraw, they would take away their commercial mining business in Katanga. **Due to economic interests in Katanga, Belgium was agreeant to withdrawing from all other parts of Congo but Katanga where the UN will not accommodate Belgium's interest to keep their cash cow operations in Belgium hands.** Over 500 Belgian troops remained in Katanga
 - ii. Belgium not only refused to withdraw but took steps to strengthen Katanga's military. Belgian troops suppressed the ANC, enabling Tshombe to

consolidate military control while providing some 250 Belgian officers and 300 foreign mercenaries, most whom were Belgium. **Thus to repel government forces from taking over the copper mines, Belgium provided Tshombe's military with expertise and manpower, allowing Katanga to further resist the central government and thus protracting the conflict.**

2. (Role of UN)

- a. **(Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding: ONUC)** Hammarskjöld was able to constantly adapt to ensure that actors continue cooperating with the UN and ONUC by addressing their concerns as well as improvise despite there being no historical precedence. Ensuring that the UN was able to maintain and build peace.
 - i. When Lumumba delivered an ultimatum to the UN demanding for all Belgium troops to be removed or he would call USSR's help to stage his own invasion, UNSC came out with UN resolution 145, directly calling for Belgium to speedily withdraw its troops and authorised the Secretary General to use all means necessary. **Illustrates how the UN was able to respond swiftly to prevent Lumumba from abandoning UN's efforts for peace and exacerbating the conflict.**
 - ii. Despite having no historical precedent and up to 3 governments who were at odds with each other, Hammarskjöld still transformed ONUC into the UN's first "multi-component" peace operation. A consultative group of experts in areas like agriculture and education was coordinated by ONUC to provide administrative advice to Congo to restore law and facilitate nation building. **Illustrating how despite the complexity and unfamiliarity of the Congo conflict, Hammarskjöld was able to push ONUC to assist in peacebuilding instead of merely enforcing, ensuring a sustainable peace.**
- b. **(Lack of Neutrality: USA, USSR, UN)** As the UNGA bowed to American pressure in recognising the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime as the sole representative of Congo and the UN's non-interference in Lumumba's execution. This only enforced many's perception that ONUC was an instrument of western imperialism. Prompting many to withdraw their support for the ONUC, undermining its ability to fulfill its mandate.
 - i. The Soviets argued that Mobutu had overthrown the legitimate Lumumba central government, hence

invalidating ONUC's mandate. Hence it refused to finance ONUC. ONUC costed up to 120 million per year when the UN budget was only 75 million. Hence while a special budget was established, the USSR refused to pay its assessments. **This plunged the UN into a financial crisis which discouraged the UN from undertaking further peace operation on the scale of ONUC**

- ii. Many countries, such as Indonesia and United Arab Republic withdrew their contingent from ONUC. **As UN inaction during the assassination of Lumumba only reinforced perceptions of ONUC partiality, many countries refused to support what was deemed as western imperialism. Loosing a quarter of manpower undermined ONUC's ability to fulfill its mandate effectively.**

- 3. **(Competition for Influence: Lumumba)** Lumumba, disillusioned with ONUC's tardiness, and carried away by his own anti-colonial rhetoric would terminate his prior cooperation with the UN and instead go on to retake the secessionist states without consultation, exacerbating the conflict.

- a. Just as Lumumba mobilised to put down Katanga's secession, Albert Kalonji declared South Kasai's autonomy. Hence Lumumba's attack also saw the ANC successfully capturing South Kasai en route to Katanga not without massacring the local Baluba people in the capital. **As Hammarskjöld would comment that they amounted to a case of incipient genocide, Lumumba's massacred only caused grievances for the local Baluba people. This emboldened Baluba militia to resist Lumumba's advances and introduce a ethnic element, prolonging the conflict.**
- b. Due to the continued presence of Belgian troops and UN refusal to put down the Katangese rebellion, Lumumba would spew anti-colonial rhetoric, antagonising Belgium, the US and UN when Congo needed them the most. Lumumba instead turned to the Soviets, which distanced him from the rest of the government which feared that Soviet Intervention would turn Congo into a cold war. **Illustrates how Lumumba's strong-anti-colonial beliefs would misled him to appeal to the USSR in a bout of opportunism, yet unleashing a bout of Cold War rivalry with dangerous ramifications. It also created more internal division.**

- 4. **(Superpower Intervention: USSR, USA)** With Lumumba's appeal to the Soviets, the Congo Crisis turned into a Cold War battleground. As the USSR used Lumumba's entreaty as a pretext to get involved, US, alarmed by Lumumba's friendliness with the Soviets also involved themselves, protracting the conflict.

- a. The Soviets saw an opportunity to meddle in an "anti-imperial" struggle in response to Lumumba's appeal after Resolution 145 failed, send approximately 10 Il-14 transport planes with crews and equipment. **With Soviet aid, Lumumba**

would become more embolden to disregard ONUC's attempts to quell the conflict and instead, with a strengthened army, mount his own attack on Katanga.

- b. Due to its fear that Lumumba was a potential ally for the USSR, CIA called for activities to undermine Lumumba politically. This included bribing Congolese politicians. Under US instructions, Andrew Cordier, Hammarskjold's representative closed all airfields and shut down the main radio stations. **Despite Cordier's role in the UN, he followed US instructions to undermine Lumumba. Lumumba was unable to fly in any troops loyal to him and lost his only means of communication with his supporters in other provinces.**

The Congo Crisis (February 1961- June 1964: Under ONUC Peace Enforcement)

Protraction of Conflict

1. **(Economic Interest, Competition for influence: Tshombe)** Tshombe refused to compromise with the central government's plan for peace even after Lumumba's assassination. Initially opening negotiations with Kasavubu towards a possible end of Katanga secession, Tshombe abandoned the talks. **This prolonged and escalated the fighting between Katanga and the central government.**
2. **(Economic Interest, Competition for Influence: Belgium and France)** Belgian and French continues support for Katanga ensured that its defiance of the central government was unable to be challenged by ONUC. As the Congo Crisis revolved around the secession of Katanga, Katanga's continuous defiance enabled by their military aid only protract the conflict.
 - a. UMHK's financial resources made it possible to recruit military expertise to defend Katanga. Some could even provide tactical supervision or using more lethal weapons like mortars. **Makes Tshombe's army more sophisticated with more advanced weaponry and expertise that allows them to resist the ANC for longer**
 - b. The Katangan *gendarmerie* numbered only 350 men in July 1960, Belgian and French aid however, transformed the army to a strength of around 11,000 with more than 2/3 being European mercenaries. **Belgium and French assistance transformed Katangan army into a formidable force that was able to resist the ANC when it should have been easily defeated due to its prior weakness in numbers**
3. **(Cold War: USSR)** As the Kasavubu-Mobutu government now recognised as the official government of Congo by the UN under American pressure, a disillusioned USSR would continue to provide support to pro-soviet forces to undermine American interests in the region.
 - a. Through Czechoslovakia, the USSR send in military equipment, food, weapons and intelligence personnel **to undermine Western plans in the Congo. Although this clandestine operation was able to prevent an open confrontation**

with the US, it strengthened another faction government, further destabilising Congo with protracted the conflict.

- b. The USSR supported the Simba Rebellion (Orientale Revolt) comprised mainly of Lumumbists and socialists. With USSR help, the rebellion gained momentum quickly and controlled almost half of the Congo. **Although the Lumumbist faction should have been dissolved due to a purge, USSR's help enabled them to once again, rise up to plunge the nation into a civil war.**

4. (Diplomacy: UN)

- a. **(Mediation)** UN mediation attempts ended in failure as they were unable to achieve a consensus with Katanga or agree to any action against Tshombe. Without a strong mandate against Tshombe, Katanga remains a secessionist state.
 - i. UNSC Resolution 161 only called for immediate withdrawal of foreign military and political elements. However, they did not directly condemn the secession of Katanga or strike against Tshombe's regime. **UNSC 161's mandate lacked the merely addressed the issue of foreign elements but not of Katanga's secession which is the main theme of the Congo Crisis**
 - ii. Hammarskjöld sought a direct conversation with Tshombe on neutral ground in Northern Rhodesia, however as the plane was approaching the airport, it crashed, killing Hammarskjöld and 15 others on board. **Hammarskjöld's death meant that the UN no longer operated on neutral grounds. This antagonises Tshombe, making the problem over Congo less likely to be resolved.**

Probe: Hammarskjöld's neutrality while rendering many UN resolutions largely lacking in resolution against Katanga, was still instrumental in branding the UN as a neutral organisation(Not giving in to Soviet demand to stop the Katangese secession). This granted ONUC a large degree of legitimacy and ensured that the Congo Crisis was contained within Congo

- b. **(Peace Enforcement)** Following Resolution 161, Hammarskjöld integrated in the use of force to subdue Katanga to achieve peace. However, UN efforts to enforce peace ended in failure, meaning that attempts to force Tshombe to a dead end failed.
 - i. Operation Rum punch aimed to target mercenaries in Katanga by seizing key points and rounding up enemies. However, due to Belgian interference, including a consul's request for arrests to be stopped

halted arrests prematurely. Many mercenaries evaded UN forces, **ensuring that Katanga retains much of its military force.**

- ii. During Operation Morthor, the Irish Siege of Jadotville saw 150 Irish troops hold out over 5000 Katangese mercenary forces. However they eventually surrendered and were taken as prisoners of war. **The UN was unsuccessful in pursuing and eliminating foreign mercenaries while it also shattered the cohesion between Hammarskjöld and the rest of the western powers.**

5. (Political Negotiations and Competition for Influence)

[1] <https://media.un.org/photo/en/asset/oun7/oun7720011>

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Operation_in_the_Congo