IH Essays

Factors for the growth of the global economy (1945-2000)

1.post-war economic reconstruction/role of US/cold war

- Western Europe
    - beyond leadership role played by USA in the creation of international institutions and systems, US had also undertaken unilateral action in the initial years to spur global economic recovery. US gave $13 billion to European Nations affected by WWII through the Marshall Plan, with a large chunk going to Germany.
    - **EV:** However, success of Marshall Plan has been debated because some estimated that aid from the MP contributed to less than 5% of Germany's national income during the time period, and other countries that received substantial MP aid exhibited lower growth than Germany. Moreover, while West G was receiving aid, it was also making reparations and restitution payments well in excess of $1 billion
- Japan
    - Between 1945 and 1952, the U.S. gave Japan $12 billion in aid, including equipment, loans, and technology. It pegged the yen at 360 to the dollar in 1949 and signed a security treaty in 1951. The U.S. supported Japan's GATT entry in 1955 and, due to limited export markets, opened its own market to Japanese goods, granting Japan most-favoured-nation status and low tariffs. This allowed Japanese exports to surge —U.S. procurement even helped save companies like Toyota from collapse.
    - **EV:** with the lowering of trade barriers and entry of Japanese automobiles into US domestic market, US suffered its first trade deficit with Japan in 1965
- **EV:** while USA had a heavy hand to play in the immediate postwar years, it was West EU and Japan that sustained what US started by supporting its open door policy and trading extensively

4.role of Western Europe and Japan/role of the state

- **Western Europe**
    - Western European governments, mostly moderate and anti-Russian conservatives, actively pursued economic growth through cooperation and reform. Their strong inter-government coordination contributed to Europe's postwar recovery, showing European initiative rather than U.S. dominance alone. In West Germany, Chancellor Erhard led key reforms: introducing the Deutsche Mark to replace worthless currency, cutting taxes to boost spending and investment, and reducing corporate tax to a flat 50%. These measures revived the economy—German absenteeism dropped significantly, and by 1958, industrial output had quadrupled since 1948.
- **Japan**
    - Japan's economic growth was driven by socio-economic policies and cultural values. The government promoted high savings by limiting welfare benefits, allowing consumer savings—18% of income on average—to be funneled into cheap loans for key industries. Culturally, traits like discipline, harmony, and group loyalty fostered cooperative labor relations, enabling a unique management system based on mutual trust. Japan's resource scarcity encouraged efficiency and hard work; by 1986, manufacturing workers averaged 2,150 hours annually but used less than half their vacation days. This blend of work ethic, savings, and industrial support underpinned Japan's economic success.

5.role of multinational corporations

- Multinational corporations (MNCs) were key drivers of technological modernisation and global economic integration. Through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), MNCs expanded control over overseas operations, spreading advanced technologies and production methods across borders. By 1973, global FDI reached $200 billion—three-quarters of which was concentrated in industrialised countries. U.S. firms led early investment, but European and Japanese MNCs like Hoechst, Allianz, Volkswagen, Toyota, and Sony quickly expanded their global reach. By 1989, the 100 largest MNCs employed 12 million people abroad. Even though only 25% of FDI went to developing countries, MNCs from the U.S., UK, Germany, and Japan accounted for most of it, playing a major role in industrialising these economies. FDI surged from $20 billion in 1970 to $200 billion by 1990, establishing MNCs as the backbone of the new international division of labour.

6.role of international organisations and arrangements

- In 1974, the IMF established the Extended Fund Facility to provide medium-term aid to developing countries facing balance of payments issues, with Kenya as the first beneficiary in 1975. In 1986, the Structural Adjustment Facility was created to offer low-interest loans to poor countries. The IMF played key roles in the 1990s, including negotiating an $18 billion loan for Mexico in 1995 to address a capital crisis, launching the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 1996 to reduce debt burdens for the poorest nations, and providing over $36 billion in loans to Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand during the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis to support stabilization and reforms.
- **EV:** Conditionality of loans through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) often required austerity measures that worsened crises like the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis by shaking investor confidence—particularly in South Korea. For example, IMF conditional loans in the 1970s and 80s to Zambia forced cuts to health and education spending, leading to a 25% rise in infant mortality between 1980 and 2000. Meanwhile, the population suffered from high illiteracy and low skills, and capital flight from well-managed South Korean banks further destabilized the economy.

7.role of oil

- Oil fueled the growth of the global economy under the direction of US-led capital intensive and oil-dependent industrialisation. In the 1950s, oil was the leading energy source; cheaper than coal, more convenient and of greater importance than other energy sources because of the rapidly expanding demand of goods that depended on it. Prices were low in the immediate post war era because of the abundance of oil, especially in the Middle East. Oil was USD2 per barrel in the 1950s. Cheap abundant oil lowered the costs of production and prices of manufactured goods, amongst other benefits for capitalist economies.
- **EV:** availability of oil at low prices plausibly contributed to and sustained post-war economic growth. However it is perhaps better understood as an immediate rather than root cause of post-war economic growth. It enabled the growth of the economies but not the fundamental reason why these economies grew at the rate they did. even with cheap oil, key actors had to decide how to use it and it was the decision of capitalist economies whose focus on manufactured goods saw them taking advantage of oil prices to spur economic growth

8.role of US [BWS]

- To promote post-war development, the U.S. led the creation of key international economic institutions, including the Bretton Woods System. This fixed exchange rate system, with currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar and the dollar tied to gold at $35 an ounce, provided global financial stability and predictability, boosting international trade. Unlike volatile floating rates, it encouraged long-term investment, directing surplus capital into fixed capital formation and foreign direct investment. This system also allowed other countries to benefit from U.S. technological and managerial leadership, reinforcing American influence in the global economy.

Challenges in the global economy

1.1973 and 1979 oil crises

- The 1973–74 and 1979 oil crises were major global shocks caused by OPEC's use of oil as a political and economic tool, especially during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. OPEC's Arab members cut production and imposed an embargo on pro-Israel countries, while earlier U.S. dollar devaluations pushed oil prices from $3 to nearly $12 a barrel by 1974, and over $30 by 1980. These surges triggered global inflation, trade imbalances, recessions, and stagflation in industrialized nations, with Japan experiencing 23% inflation. Developing countries, reliant on oil imports, faced rising industrial costs, increased debt, and greater dependence on foreign loans. The crises caused falling industrial output, mass unemployment, and major financial instability, revealing the world economy's deep vulnerability to energy supply disruptions.
- **EV:** Both OPEC and the Soviet Union benefited economically from the oil crises of the 1970s. OPEC nations, especially Gulf states, saw massive revenue increases from the surge in oil prices, leading to vast inflows of petrodollars used for military spending, infrastructure, and investment in Western financial markets. However, internal divisions emerged as some members flouted production quotas to maximize income. The Soviet Union, though not an OPEC member, also profited from high oil prices, using the windfall to strengthen its economy and fund Cold War activities, gaining geopolitical leverage while Western economies struggled with inflation and recession.

2.Protectionism

- In the late 20th century, protectionism increased in response to global economic changes, especially after the 1970s oil shocks. The U.S. faced rising trade and budget deficits, while countries like Japan, Western European nations, and newly industrializing Asian economies became strong, efficient competitors. To protect domestic industries, many governments introduced tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and non-tariff barriers—affecting 28% of industrial world trade by 1987. Economic slowdowns, trade imbalances with countries like Japan and China, and domestic political pressures, such as lobbying by farmers and manufacturers, further fueled the turn away from open markets.
  - ***US trade imbalance***
  - In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. economy faced stagflation, driven by heavy government spending, poor fiscal policies, and two major oil shocks. Inflation reached nearly 10% by 1973, and oil import costs rose sharply from $4 billion in 1970 to $90 billion in 1980. Budget and trade deficits worsened, especially in the 1980s under Reagan's tax cuts and military spending. A strong dollar hurt exports and deepened trade imbalances. To protect domestic industries, the U.S. imposed import taxes and coordinated currency devaluation through the 1985 Plaza Agreement. These challenges exposed the global economy's overreliance on the U.S., whose inconsistent leadership included a shift toward protectionism.
- **EV:** Despite rising protectionist pressures, many countries remained committed to free

trade due to its long-term benefits. The ‘infant industry’ and ‘domestic protection’ arguments justified temporary trade barriers to support industrial growth and protect employment, but these were seen as short-term measures. At the same time, global trade expanded through stronger international rules from the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Regional blocs like NAFTA and APEC promoted economic cooperation while managing national interests. Trade continued to grow through the 1990s, with advanced economies remaining closely linked, making widespread protectionism risky due to fears of retaliation.

3.debt crises of the 1980s

- In the 1970s, developing countries borrowed heavily due to economic struggles like overreliance on low-value exports and worsening terms of trade, made harder by protectionism from developed nations. Western banks, flush with petrodollars, offered low-interest loans, but much of the money was wasted on oil imports, military spending, or lost to corruption. When interest rates rose and petrodollar flows stopped, debt burdens became unmanageable—Mexico defaulted in 1982, followed by Brazil in 1987. IMF austerity programs led to deep social hardship, while the Baker and Brady Plans offered limited relief. The crisis triggered economic stagnation, unemployment, and unrest across the developing world.

Overall,

- oil crisis > protectionism > debt crisis
- Oil crisis lead to debts which led to protectionism
- Oil crisis and protectionism was a global factor that impacted both 1st and 3rd world country while debt crisis mainly affected 3rd world countries

Sample qns

- ‘The global economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s were anomaliesmore than they were permanent structural issues.’ Discuss.
    - ***In 1971, when the USA announced the end of dollar-gold convertibility, the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate system that was once considered the centrepiece of the capitalist world economy crumbled. In 1973, oil, a previously affordable commodity that drove industries everywhere, became exorbitantly priced. Throughout the 1970s, protectionist barriers were erected more readily, contradicting free trade principles espoused during the Golden Age of Capitalism. Indeed, most of these issues appeared to be brief anomalies, as prices naturally self-corrected within a short period, typically around two years. However, one could not consider them brief anomalies, because exchange rate volatility became the new normal, oil prices continued fluctuating throughout the next few decades, especially when political crises flared up in the Middle East, and protectionist sentiments remained entrenched. Moreover, during the 1980s, Third World countries such as Mexico and Brazil found themselves trapped in a relentless debt cycle from which they struggled to break free. Hence, one could consider the problems as permanent structural issues that could not be so readily addressed or resolved. This essay will seek to explain how the problems were created by unanticipated triggers, but will more critically examine the deep-rooted causes of each problem that made them a structural issue over the long term.***
- How far do you agree that the attempts to fix the problems with the global economy in the

1970s and 1980s were futile?

- ***The problems affecting the global economy in the 1970s and 1980s were the oil crises of the 1970s, the rise of protectionism and the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s. While attempts made to regulate the price of oil and moderate the effects of the oil shocks, as well as efforts to overcome protectionist measures worked to a large extent, the attempts to resolve the Third World debt crisis were instead futile. This was because there was collective commitment to address the first two problems, whereas there was a lack of cooperation and inertia to address the latter. Hence, I disagree to a large extent that the attempts to fix the problems with the global economy in the 1970s and 1980s were futile = pointless / useless.***

JAPAN

<u>FACTORS</u>

1.CONGLOMERATES

- Japan's economic transformation is explained through the keiretsu system. Keiretsu were networks of companies with interlocking business ties and shared ownership, enabling them to act strategically as groups, achieve economies of scale, and build Japan's global competitiveness. Vertical integration in distribution keiretsu allowed manufacturers like Sony, Panasonic, and Toshiba to control retail pricing and branding, while "salespersons on loan" boosted retail productivity by directly driving sales. By tightly coordinating production and distribution, keiretsu enhanced efficiency and strengthened Japan's global economic performance, making them central to Japan's rapid postwar growth.

2.STATE

- Japan's economic transformation is also explained through the Japanese government. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) coordinated industrial policy, shaping both domestic development and external competitiveness. From the 1950s, MITI targeted heavy industries like steel, shipbuilding, and electronics with tax incentives, tariff exemptions, and preferential access to import quotas and patents. Working with the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan, MITI channelled cheap, long-term credit through agencies like the JDB and EIBJ, encouraging firms to expand in strategic export sectors.By guiding resources into key industries and reducing financial risks for firms, the Japanese government created the conditions for rapid industrial growth and export-led development, making state coordination central to Japan's economic transformation.

3.JAPANESE PEOPLE

- The Japanese people also serve as an explanation of Japan' economic transformation. The Japanese were served well by historically conditioned cultural traits, such as acceptance of authority, paternalism, a desire for harmony, and discipline. Group consciousness prevailed over individualism. Without these traits, Japan's labour management system would hardly have been possible. Mutual harmony between workers and management rather than confrontation. Japan's death of raw materials necessitated hard work to attain, conserve and use them efficiently. Thus, the role of the Japanese people was a crucial social foundation that enabled Japan's broader economic transformation.

4.EXTERNAL CONDITIONS - US

- During the Korean War from 1950-1953, Japan experienced an economic boom that was financed by the US through a wartime emergency system known as Special procurements. This was a way for the US army to buy supplies locally in Japan without having to go through complex processes. As such, this pumped $3.5 billion dollars into Japan, which was the amount the Marshall Plan poured into West Germany. These payments were 27% of Japan's total export trade and it benefited conglomerates such as Toyota greatly as they made profits from selling trucks to the US military.

- The Vietnam War also gave rise to Japan's economic fortune, where the annual economic growth was 14.6% from 1966-1970. Japan had become an industrial base for the US military effort in the Vietnam War with shipyards going on triple shifts to meet the enormous demand for cargo ships and tankers as well. As such, by 1973, Japan's share of world GDP rose to 12.9%. Hence, it was due to these favourable external circumstances such as the Cold War which allowed Japan to receive such an enormous economic boom, as the circumstances acted as a stimulus that allowed the economy to revive and grow.

5.EXTERNAL CONDITIONS - OIL

- Oil fueled the growth of the global economy under the direction of US-led capital intensive and oil-dependent industrialisation. In the 1950s, oil was the leading energy source; cheaper than coal, more convenient and of greater importance than other energy sources because of the rapidly expanding demand of goods that depended on it. Prices were low in the immediate post war era because of the abundance of oil, especially in the Middle East. Oil was USD2 per barrel in the 1950s. Cheap abundant oil lowered the costs of production and prices of manufactured goods, amongst other benefits for capitalist economies.
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<u>EV</u>

1.STATE > PEOPLE

- Hence, suggesting the effectiveness of the focus on export-oriented industrialisation in the growth of Japan's economy. Socio-economic changes focused and benefitted mainly in more internal ways as it allowed Japanese sectors to flourish within its local consumers.

2.STATE > EXT CONDITIONS

- In the short run, American assistance helped stabilize inflation and balance budgets, providing immediate recovery support in the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, this aid tapered off by the mid-1950s. In the long run, Japan's state-led policies proved decisive. Institutions like MITI (founded in 1949) directed industrial policy by selecting strategic sectors such as automobiles and electronics, providing subsidies, tax breaks, and import protection. This approach fostered globally competitive industries, leading to a 35-fold increase in industrial output by 1970 and an average growth rate of 9.7% between 1955 and 1973. Thus, while U.S. aid contributed to short-term stability, Japan's economic miracle was sustained primarily through effective domestic policies.

3.STATE > CONGLOMERATES

- Conglomerates and industries were very much still developing and destroyed after WW2. Without the government's intervention like restrictions foreign car imports, the industries could not grow and survive

4.PEOPLE > EXT CONDITIONS

- Japan certainly benefited from American aid, access to U.S. markets, and a secure geopolitical environment during the Cold War, but these advantages would have been wasted without a population ready to transform them into sustained growth. High literacy rates and a strong pre-war tradition of technical education meant workers could rapidly absorb and improve foreign technology. Household saving rates of 20–30 percent gave domestic banks the capital to invest long after U.S. assistance ended. A culture of diligence, teamwork, and lifetime employment fostered exceptionally high productivity and labour peace, while managers embraced kaizen (continuous improvement) and quality-control methods that turned borrowed ideas into world-leading industries. In short, external conditions opened doors, but it was the commitment, skill, and adaptability of Japan's people that kept the economy surging once aid tapered off and global conditions changed.

5.PEOPLE > CONGLOMERATES

- Engineers, technicians, and factory workers continually improved processes, reduced waste, and increased efficiency—a practice known as kaizen. Japanese automobile and electronics firms, for example, were able to take existing technology and refine it into high-quality, globally competitive products. This constant innovation and adaptability came from the people themselves; without their technical expertise, problem-solving, and disciplined work ethic, the corporate frameworks of the conglomerates would have been ineffective. In essence, the corporations were platforms, but it was the Japanese people who powered the economic miracle.

6.EXT CONDITIONS > CONGLOMERATES

- The zaibatsu system was the dominant system before the war was broken up by the 1947 Zaibatsu Disposition Law, which broke up the major Zaibatsu families into smaller companies and prohibited them from engaging in certain activities. The Zaibatsu Disposition Law - passed as part of American efforts to democratize and decentralise the Japanese economy to counter the spread of Communism during the Cold War - was central to the end of the Zaibatsu system that led to the rise of the Keiretsu system. Hence, the external circumstances of the Cold War allowed Japanese business conglomerates to flourish post World War II.

Indo-Pakistani Conflict (1947-1972)

Causes:

1.decolonisation

- The 1947 Partition of British India created two states—India and Pakistan (including East and West Pakistan)—in a rushed and poorly managed process. This led to widespread violence and mass displacement, with millions of Muslims migrating to Pakistan and millions of Hindus and Sikhs moving to India. Britain's Labour government, eager to end colonial rule after failed attempts to form a federation, agreed to Muhammad Ali Jinnah's demand for a separate Muslim state. Power was transferred on August 14-15, 1947. Pakistan claimed Kashmir based on its Muslim majority.

2.security

- Newly independent Pakistan sought to strengthen itself politically and militarily but faced ongoing threats from India. Kashmir held immense strategic importance as a buffer zone protecting both countries from external powers like China and the USSR. For leaders in India and Pakistan, losing Kashmir was unacceptable due to its military value. Pakistan feared that if India controlled Kashmir, it could encircle Pakistan and intensify pressure on its vulnerable northeastern border, threatening Pakistan's survival.

3.territorial sovereignty

- The conflict over Jammu and Kashmir was fueled when Maharaja Hari Singh, the Hindu ruler of the predominantly Muslim princely state, chose to join India, a decision Pakistan disputed. This led to an invasion by Pakistani tribal militias and a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. The dispute was rooted in the Two-Nation Theory, championed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, which argued that Muslims and Hindus were distinct nations requiring separate states to protect their unique customs and rights.

4.nationalism

- The Kashmir conflict reflects a deep clash between competing national identities and the struggle for self-determination. Pakistan views Kashmir as essential to its Islamic identity, rooted in the Two-Nation Theory and the belief that its Muslim-majority population naturally belongs within Pakistan. India, on the other hand, sees Kashmir as a crucial symbol of its secular, multi-ethnic democracy—its inclusion disproves the Two-Nation Theory and affirms India's pluralist foundations. Meanwhile, many Kashmiri Muslims advocate for independence based on a distinct cultural identity (Kashmiriyat), but their aspirations are undermined by opposition from both India and Pakistan, as well as internal divisions. For both nations, Kashmir has become central to national legitimacy, making its status a highly contested and emotionally charged issue.

5.religion

- Kashmir holds deep symbolic and cultural significance for both Hindus and Muslims, fueling intense competition over its control. For Hindus, it is considered the purest source of their civilisation, with India's ruling elite tracing their lineage to the Aryan Hindus of Kashmir. For Muslims, Kashmir has long been a centre of Islamic culture and is seen as an earthly reflection of the paradise described in the Quran. These powerful religious and historical associations have made Kashmir a deeply contested and emotionally charged territory for both communities.

6.economic interests

- Tensions between India and Pakistan are heightened by competition over the Indus River, a vital source of water for both countries. The 1960 Indus Water Treaty, brokered by the World Bank, aimed to regulate water sharing, but mutual distrust remains. Control over Kashmir is central to this issue, as it gives India access to the river's headwaters. For India, this ensures irrigation and strategic leverage, while for Pakistan, the Indus is essential for agriculture and survival. Fears persist that India could use water as a tool of coercion, threatening Pakistan's already limited fertile land and water security.

<u>Role of different actors in the development of conflicts</u>

1.combatant states

- **role of Pakistan**
- Pakistan violated its Standstill Agreement with Kashmir by imposing an economic blockade and later supported an invasion using Pathan tribesmen, who crossed into Kashmir on 21 October 1947 and advanced close to Srinagar. Pakistan aimed to exploit a Muslim uprising

in western Kashmir to force the region's accession. India responded militarily after the Maharaja acceded to India. Pakistan, however, rejected the accession as illegal, calling it a result of "fraud and violence," and argued that Kashmir's Muslim majority meant it rightfully belonged to Pakistan. In May 1948, Jinnah escalated the conflict by sending regular Pakistani troops to prevent full Indian control, which India viewed as an invasion. The resulting full-scale war lasted 14 months, with hostilities continuing between the two countries.

- **Role of India**
- India's growing involvement in the East Pakistan crisis directly led to the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. By arming and training rebels and allowing cross-border attacks, India escalated tensions with Pakistan. The massive influx of refugees—millions fleeing to India—placed immense social and economic pressure on the country, prompting India to pursue military action. India's support for the secular Awami League and its goal of creating an independent Bangladesh aligned with its ideological interests and strategic objectives. With China unlikely to intervene, India launched a full-scale military offensive in December 1971, leading to a swift defeat of Pakistani forces and the formal creation of Bangladesh, decisively reshaping South Asia's political landscape.
- **EV: PAKISTAN > INDIA**
- Pakistan's aggressive military actions—specifically initiating both the 1947 invasion with the infiltration of Pathan tribesmen and the 1965 Operation Gibraltar offensive—were the main triggers that led to the Indo-Pakistani wars between 1947 and 1971. These deliberate attacks provoked India's defensive responses aimed at protecting Kashmir, highlighting Pakistan's role as the initiator of conflict. While Pakistan claimed to defend Kashmiri Muslims, the failure to gain local support undermines this justification and points to Pakistan's strategic motives. Therefore, Pakistan's initiation of both wars through aggressive tactics makes its stance more impactful in causing and prolonging the conflict.

2.the Superpowers

- During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the superpowers played key roles in shaping the conflict. The USA continued to support Pakistan, providing economic aid even as other World Bank members questioned its effectiveness under the Yahya regime. President Nixon opposed efforts to cut aid and warned India against initiating war, framing the East Pakistan crisis as Pakistan's internal matter. In contrast, the USSR backed India, signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in August 1971, which served as a strategic deterrent against China and Pakistan. By October, the USSR openly supported India's position on Bangladeshi independence, seeing India as a valuable regional partner and a model for Soviet influence, especially after China's admission to the UN Security Council.

3.the United Nations

- **lol idc abt this factor**

<u>Effectiveness of conflict management</u>

1.diplomacy[EFFECTIVE]

- The 1972 Simla Agreement, signed under superpower pressure near the end of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, marked a shift towards peaceful, bilateral conflict resolution following Pakistan's defeat and the creation of Bangladesh. Both countries agreed to resolve disputes through negotiations and to respect the Line of Control (LoC) as a temporary boundary in Kashmir. While it did not solve the Kashmir issue, the agreement formalized the LoC and set a framework to prevent further military conflict. It also represented a move away from reliance on international bodies like the UN towards direct diplomacy, emphasizing mutual recognition and cooperation. The agreement reflected India's pragmatic choice to negotiate rather than dominate, reducing regional tensions and establishing a basis for diplomatic peace in the short term.

2.peacekeeping [EFFECTIVE]

- In March 1951, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor the ceasefire from the First Indo-Pakistan War. With around 50 military observers, UNMOGIP supervised the ceasefire, facilitated communication between forces, and helped prevent minor incidents from escalating into full conflict. From 1949 to 1958, cooperation between local commanders made UNMOGIP effective, as most incidents were minor border crossings. After the 1971 war, despite no new UN mandate, UNMOGIP continued observing the ceasefire, maintaining its role to this day in monitoring peace along the Line of Control.

3.fundamental issues [INEFFECTIVE]

- Despite multiple mediation efforts like the UN's Resolution 47 and the 1949 ceasefire establishing the Line of Control (LoC), conflict management between India and Pakistan remained ineffective. Deep mistrust and competing national identities over Kashmir prevented compromise. The 1971 war, which led to the creation of Bangladesh, weakened Pakistan's ideological position, reflected in the 1972 Simla Agreement. While the Simla Agreement formalized the LoC and shifted talks to a bilateral framework, it failed to address the core ideological disputes or Kashmir's future, allowing the conflict to continue unresolved.

Overall,

- fundamental issues > diplomacy
    - The Simla Agreement temporarily stopped military conflict and set a framework for peaceful talks but failed to resolve the deep ideological tensions between India's secular nationalism and Pakistan's Islamic nationalism that fueled the war since 1947. These opposing views continued to shape their foreign policies and hinder progress. While both agreed to bilateral negotiations, India saw the agreement as a final settlement rejecting external involvement, whereas Pakistan, weakened by defeat, viewed the dispute as unresolved and sought outside mediation. Overall, diplomatic efforts from 1947 to 1972 failed to address these core ideological differences.
- fundamental issues > peacekeeping
    - Though conflict management may have led to the prevention of conflict escalation, proving effectiveness to some extent, their presence also reduced the incentive for India and Pakistan to negotiate a permanent resolution. Despite these peacekeeping efforts, the ceasefire was more of a temporary pause rather than a long-term solution, as fundamental issues remained unresolved. This was seen especially with the 2nd and 3rd Indo-Pakistan wars still happening despite UNMOGIP presence, proving that they only prevented conflict in the short run, but conflict would still emerge in the long run due to unresolved issues between India and Pakistan

Arab-Israeli Conflict (1948-1979)

Causes

1.territorial interests

- **Partition Plan:** The 1947 UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181), which proposed dividing Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, faced several problems. Although the Zionists accepted the plan as a first step toward statehood, they were dissatisfied with the territorial discontinuity and the international status of Jerusalem. Arab leaders, however, rejected the plan outright, arguing it violated over 1,800 years of Palestinian history and unfairly allocated land—granting 55% of the territory to Jews who then owned less than 10% of the land and made up less than 10% of the population. Despite these objections, the UN General Assembly passed the plan on 29 November 1947 by a two-thirds majority vote. When Israel declared independence in May 1948, neighboring Arab states invaded, framing their intervention as the defense of Arab land.
- **4 Territories:** After Israel's victory and expansion in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Arab resentment centered around the loss of key territories such as the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, which drove Egypt, Jordan, and Syria to enter later conflicts like the 1967 Six-Day War with the explicit aim of recovering these strategic lands. These Arab leaders consistently framed their military campaigns as nationalistic efforts to reclaim "occupied Arab land" and reverse the territorial consequences of earlier defeats, seen in their hardline stance in the 1967 Khartoum Resolution and the focus of the 4th conflict in 1973 in yom kippur war on recovering Sinai and the Golan Heights.

2.security

- Both the Arab states and Israel wanted to ensure their freedom from or resilience against potential threats from the other party. This led to occupation, insurgency, and terrorism, creating a climate where neither side could fully trust the other. Each perceived the other's intentions and capabilities as threats to their own security interests. In response, both parties took actions aimed at deterring or defending against possible attacks. However, these actions were seen by the other side as threats themselves, prompting further measures to strengthen defense and deterrence. This cycle increased the likelihood of conflict and made both sides less willing to make concessions that might compromise their security. At times, though, shared security interests led both parties to pursue cooperation in order to reduce the chances of military conflict.

3.nationalism

- The Arab-Israeli Conflict centres on two rival nationalisms: Jewish Zionism and Palestinian/ Arab nationalism, both claiming rights to the same land. Zionism arose in response to European anti-Semitism and aimed to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, seen as the historic land of the Jews. Jewish migration surged in the 1930s due to rising persecution, especially under Hitler. Meanwhile, Palestinian nationalism developed as a reaction to the growing Jewish presence, driven by fears of displacement and loss of political control. Arab nationalism also intensified, with surrounding Arab states viewing Zionism as a colonial threat and supporting the Palestinian claim to the land. To the Arabs, Palestine was an Arab land cultivated for generations, and they rejected the idea of becoming a minority in their own country.

4.religion

- Religious fundamentalism became a powerful force in intensifying the Arab-Israeli conflict, as political and religious leaders on both sides invoked sacred claims to mobilise support and justify hostility. For Jews, Jerusalem symbolised divine legitimacy as the ancient capital of David and Solomon, home to the Western Wall and the destroyed Second Temple, with Zionist leaders often framing the return to the land in biblical terms. For Muslims, Jerusalem's significance as the site of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, where the Prophet Muhammad was believed to have ascended to heaven, was repeatedly emphasised by Arab leaders to portray the conflict as a defence of Islam itself. By framing territorial disputes as battles for faith, both sides elevated the struggle beyond politics into a spiritually charged confrontation, making compromise over control of holy sites appear as a betrayal of religious duty and thus intensifying the conflict.
- Religious differences played a significant role in causing the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the increasing Jewish presence in Palestine was seen by the Arab population as a threat to traditional family and communal structures, undermining the Arab character of the region. Arabs regarded the Zionists as outsiders who sought to subvert and corrupt indigenous culture, while Jews, identifying with European culture, aimed to recreate it in Palestine and considered themselves cultural and moral emissaries. This mutual perception deepened mistrust: the Zionists viewed Arabs as politically tyrannical, socially stagnant, and culturally passive, while Arabs perceived Jewish immigration as an intrusion that destabilized their way of life, leading to mounting tensions that fueled the conflict.

5.economic interests

- The economic disparities between Arabs and Jews in Palestine were a significant source of conflict, as Zionist land purchases led to the dispossession and marginalisation of Palestinian Arabs, who increasingly saw the Jewish settlers as an alien economic rival responsible for their peripheralisation and impoverishment. This hostility was intensified during the Great Depression of the 1930s, when many Palestinian Arab cultivators lost their land through foreclosures and those forced to migrate to urban areas were relegated to the lowest rungs of the economic ladder. By the 1930s, around 30% of Palestinian farmers had become completely landless, while another 75–80% owned insufficient land to sustain themselves. Zionist policies further deepened this divide, as they deliberately sought economic autonomy by severing links with the Arab economy, including refusing to employ Arab workers, which in turn reinforced Palestinian Arabs' determination to resist the Zionist enterprise.

Overall,

1. **Territorial interests > Religious Differences:**
    - Ultimately, AIC was a dispute driven more by territorial interests than religious differences. It was seen that religious issues, rather than actually driving the conflict, was merely intensified by territorial issues, making territorial interests the real reason as to why the AIC conflict worsened. The UN Partition Plan brought to light the seriousness of territorial disputes and how both the Arabs and the Israelis viewed it with importance. The Zionists extended beyond the boundaries of the original partition lines, which was countered by the neighbouring Arab states, aiming to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel, showing their support towards

Palestinian Arab claims to the land. Religious differences merely brought more fuel to the central issue of territorial disputes. Across the Arab societies, Israel was viewed as a Jewish reincarnation of the medieval Crusader state, which threatened the Arab world due to conflicting religious issues as well. While this also added pressure to the Arab States to act, leading to the start of the War of Independence, it is clear that religious differences merely gave the Arab States **justification** and added fuel to the situation which was caused by the territorial disputes, rather than actually driving the conflict itself. Therefore, while religion did heightened tensions, it was ultimately the territorial disputes that kickstarted the conflict and caused an increase in religious tensions as a by-product.

- Ultimately, AIC was a dispute driven more by territorial interests than religious differences. Religious identity and nationalism acted more as an emotional force which framed territorial losses as existential threats as seen in the 1973 Yom Kippur War which was motivated by unresolved territorial disputes and blurred lines between land and faith, making religion something that more so emboldened the true driving force of the AIC, which is territorial interests, than being its own force that drove the conflict independently. The Six-Day war in 1967 and the Arab states' attempts in 1967 and 1973 to claim Sinai, Golan Heights, West Bank and Gaza Strip proved that it was territorial calculations and nationalistic ambitions that constantly determined war aims and strategies. Thus, it was seen that even in the long run and throughout the conflict, because of the prolonged and various number of conflicts, it shows that territorial disputes was the main cause of it all. Therefore although religious symbolism undoubtedly heightened tensions, the outbreak of every major war was triggered by the loss of territories. The repeated Arab attempts to reverse the territorial consequences of 1948, 1967, 1973 underline how land remained the structural core of the conflict. Therefore in the long run, territorial issues was the main issue of the conflict while religious tensions made them worse.

2. **Territorial Interests > Nationalism:** Territorial Interests fuelled nationalism. Arab states were not always united, but territorial interests allowed them to unite under one united issue which is the partition plan.
3. **Territorial Interests > Security:** Territorial interests sparked the security concerns. Bcs they fought to secure land, they now scared of the other attacking them to take back land for e.g.
4. **Territorial Interests > Economic Interests:** Yet economic disparities were the less primary contributing cause when compared to the more tangible territorial disputes. This is because economic disparities merely acted as a catalyst for the already existing problems brought on by territorial disputes. Territorial disputes directly and measurably contributed to the 3 wars that happened as Israel fought to defend territorial sovereignty, while the arabs fought to reclaim lost territories. Meanwhile, economic grievances only served to exacerbate and amplify existing grievances arising from territorial disputes. Hence, as territorial disputes are the more direct factor, they are the more significant one, thus making them the more primary cause when compared to economic disparities or grievances. Hence, territorial disputes are the more primary cause of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Security

Religious fundamentalism

Economic interests
Yk what its common sense

Territorial interests > nationalism > security > religious differences

<u>Role of different actors in the development of conflicts</u>

1.combatant states

- **Arab States**
- Arab states played a decisive combatant role in the Arab–Israeli Conflict by repeatedly mobilising armies and shaping the course of each war. In 1948 Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, and Iraq invaded the new State of Israel immediately after its declaration of independence, turning a political dispute into a regional war. Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the massing of Egyptian and Syrian forces on Israel's borders in 1967 again escalated tensions into open conflict, prompting the Six-Day War. Even in 1973, Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur offensive in a coordinated bid to regain lost territory. Through these sustained military campaigns and strategic decisions, the Arab states acted as primary combatants whose actions repeatedly reignited the fighting and shaped the trajectory of the conflict.
- **Israel**
- Following its declaration of independence in **1948**, Israel's victory in the **Arab-Israeli War** displaced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, creating a **refugee crisis** that fueled ongoing regional tensions. Israel's occupation of territories such as the **West Bank and Gaza Strip after the 1967 Six-Day War** further exacerbated disputes with Arab neighbors and sparked resistance movements. Its settlement expansions and military reprisals reinforced Arab perceptions of Israel as an aggressor, contributing to repeated conflicts, including the **Yom Kippur War in 1973**. Overall, Israel's pursuit of security and territorial consolidation, while defensive from its perspective, directly intensified hostilities and prolonged the AIC during this period.

2.the Superpowers [COLD WAR]

- **US:** The basis for US involvement in the AIC was its **policy of containment**. In its quest to prevent Soviet penetration into the region, the US supplied some Arab states with arms from 1954 onwards, seeking to create an **anti-Soviet bloc** around countries that were hostile to the West and potentially pro-Moscow, such as Egypt. Subsequently, in January 1957, the US announced the **Eisenhower Doctrine**, which pledged that it would use armed force to assist any Middle Eastern country requesting support against communism. US-Israel relations also strengthened after the **1967 war**, as the US recognized Israel's military might as a valuable asset in containing Soviet influence in the region. This new strategic relationship began in 1968 with the sale of 50 Phantom fighter-bombers to Israel and was reinforced by US military aid, which enabled Israel to recover from the Arabs' devastating initial assault during the **1973 war**. By supplying Israel with sufficient weaponry to remain stronger than the sum of its enemies, the US hoped to deter Arab military action. If the Arabs sought to reclaim territory, they would have to negotiate with Israel, and if they were unwilling, the US could be approached to help pressure Israel. In the **zero-sum Cold War game**, it benefited the US if the Arabs turned to the US for mediation.
- **USSR:** Soviets exploited the Arab-Israeli conflict in an effort to break containment and thus obtain a regional advantage over the CW adversary. This might then translate into a

global advantage. After the Suez Crisis, they embarked on a noble mission to aid the Egyptians and other Arab states Soviet communism and radical Arab nationalism were, however, only partners of convenience. Apart from the provision of arms to Egypt in 1955, the USSR had also deliberately escalated regional tensions on the eve of the 1967 war to energise an anti-Israel, pro-Soviet alliance. In addition, it restocked the arsenals of its clients in the aftermath of the war, so that they were able to launch an attack on Israel again in 1973. The soviets were thus the chief suppliers of the military option to the various Arab states

3.the United Nations

- The 1947 UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181), which proposed dividing Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, faced several problems. Both proposed states would have been territorially fragmented, and while economic unity was suggested, it undermined the logic of separation. A major concern was the significant Arab population that would be left within the proposed Jewish state. Although the Zionists accepted the plan as a first step toward statehood, they were dissatisfied with the territorial discontinuity and the international status of Jerusalem. Arab leaders, however, rejected the plan outright, arguing it violated over 1,800 years of Palestinian history and unfairly allocated land—granting 55% of the territory to Jews who then owned less than 10% of the land and made up less than 10% of the population. Despite these objections, the UN General Assembly passed the plan on 29 November 1947 by a two-thirds majority vote.

Overall,

- **Arab States > Israel:** At least one Arab State was constantly in conflict with Israel, while israel, a single entity, would not be at conflict with the arab states. After the 6 day war the **Khartoum Resolution** of the Arab League adopted the "Three No's": *no peace, no recognition, no negotiations* with Israel. Even when individual Arab leaders (e.g., Jordan's King Hussein) explored dialogue, collective Arab pressure often forced them to pull back until the 1970s.
- **Combatant States > Superpowers:** The local combatant states had **immediate operational control and influence on the battlefield**. Even if superpowers supplied weapons, training, or intelligence, it was ultimately the Arab states and Israel who made tactical decisions, chose offensive or defensive strategies, and responded to on-the-ground realities. For instance, during the **Yom Kippur War (1973)**, Egypt and Syria coordinated attacks that initially achieved tactical success, regardless of superpower intentions.
- **Combatant States > UN:** The combatant states had **direct authority over their military actions and territorial decisions**, while the UN could only pass resolutions or act as a mediator. The UN had no standing army and relied on peacekeeping forces or ceasefire monitoring. For example, **UN Resolution 242** after the 1967 war could call for withdrawal, but Israel and Arab states implemented policies based on their own interests, not UN directives.
- **Superpowers > UN:** Superpowers (primarily the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War) could **shape UN actions through veto power and diplomatic influence**. In the Security Council, either could block resolutions unfavorable to their allies, or pressure the UN to adopt positions that supported their strategic goals. For instance, U.S. support often protected Israel in the UN, while the USSR backed Arab states, limiting the UN's independent authority.

Effectiveness of conflict management

1.US diplomacy [EFFECTIVE]

- The Camp David Accords, held from 5–17 September 1978 and brokered by the US, led to a major breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The summit produced two key agreements: one normalising relations between Egypt and Israel in exchange for Israel's complete withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, and another outlining a framework for future Palestinian autonomy based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Despite opposition from other Arab states and the Palestinians, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty on 26 March 1979. This marked the first recognition of Israel by an Arab state and included full diplomatic ties and access to key waterways. The accords showed that external powers like the US could effectively mediate the conflict, as Egypt and Israel were more willing to take concrete steps toward peace under American influence than through direct bilateral engagement.

2.UN peacekeeping [EFFECTIVE]

- The creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in November 1956 marked a significant moment in peacekeeping during the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its mandate was to separate opposing forces and stabilise the region through non-violent means, helping to prevent the Suez Crisis from escalating into a Cold War confrontation by excluding troops from permanent UNSC members. UNEF supervised the withdrawal of British and French forces by December 1956 and Israeli forces by March 1957. Its presence helped maintain a ceasefire among Arab states, significantly reducing violence and keeping the border largely quiet for nearly a decade. Though it brought only an uneasy truce, UNEF I effectively stabilised the situation in the short term and demonstrated the potential of UN peacekeeping in managing regional tensions.

3.AIC fundamental issues [INEFFECTIVE]

- The 1948 Arab-Israeli War ended with Israel expanding its territory to 80% of Palestine, but no lasting peace was achieved, setting the stage for continued conflict. This unresolved tension was later reflected in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-Day War, where UN Security Council Resolution 242 became a major obstacle to peace due to its ambiguity. The resolution's vague call for Israeli withdrawal from "territories occupied" led to conflicting interpretations: Israel viewed it as allowing for negotiated territorial adjustments to ensure its security, while Arab states saw it as demanding full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied areas, including the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. These fundamentally opposing views have undermined every attempt at a comprehensive peace settlement, with each side clinging to its interpretation, contributing to repeated breakdowns in negotiations.

Overall,

- Fundamental Issues > Peacekeeping
  - UNEF I's limited mandate meant it couldn't resolve underlying tensions between Israel and Egypt. When Egypt requested withdrawal in May 1967, UN had to comply, leading to the Six-Day War. Thus, while the UNEF may had been effective at managing conflict short term, when they left, it was clear that conflict still returned to the region as the UNEF's role was only to observe, but not to change any underlying reason for the breakout of conflict between the Arab states and Israel. Since the underlying reasons of the conflict like the differing priorities of the Arab states and Israel were not addressesed, it is clear that the UNEF's role to manage

conflict in the region was ineffective.

- Fundamental Issues > Diplomacy
  - Camp David Accords and most acts of diplomacy did not include all parties, especially Palestinians, whose land was actively a sensitive issue in this conflict. Crucially, this led to their wants not being voiced, with them often also being sidelined in favour of the personal aims of the countries that were involved in negotiations. Thus, as core Palestinians and Arab state aims were never fully addressed in full, no party was ever satisfied in their demands and they remain hostile to Israel because of this, thus making diplomatic efforts ineffective.
- Peacekeeping > Diplomacy : Diplomacy only between Egypt and Israel

Congo

Causes

1.decolonisation

- The process of granting the Congolese their independence was rushed and poorly managed. In January 1959, riots in Leopoldville following an ABAKO demonstration forced Belgium to accelerate plans for decolonisation. Although a round-table conference was held in January 1960, where Congolese leaders demanded immediate independence and the Belgians preferred a gradual transition, Belgium eventually agreed to grant full independence on 30 June 1960 — barely six months later. Elections in May 1960 brought Patrice Lumumba's MNC to power, but the Congo was gravely unprepared for self-rule. Under Belgian rule, political activity had been suppressed, and very few Congolese had received higher education — only 0.5% by 1958. Consequently, at independence, there was a severe shortage of trained administrators and professionals. Belgium's hasty withdrawal and desire to retain control over the Congo's economy and army left the new nation politically unstable and institutionally weak.

2.domestic politics

- The Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) was deeply divided by ideological and regional rivalries. Internal splits emerged between a moderate faction that supported a centralised Congo and a more radical faction that pushed for federalism, resulting in the formation of MNC-Lumumba (MNC-L) under Patrice Lumumba in Stanleyville and MNC-Kalonji, influential in Elisabethville and among the Baluba ethnic group. The MNC's uneasy alliance with ABAKO was also strained, as ABAKO championed ethnic and territorial nationalism, contrasting with the MNC's vision of a united Congo. These tensions culminated in a constitutional crisis in September 1960 between Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu. The broader political instability encouraged secessionist movements, such as Tshombe's Katanga—which declared independence in July 1960 with Belgian support—and Kalonji's South Kasai, which declared autonomy in August 1960 amid ethnic violence. Together, these divisions reflected the Congo's fragmented political landscape and undermined national unity after independence.

3.economic interests

- The Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), a powerful Belgian mining company, was central to the Congo Crisis as it controlled the copper-rich Katanga region, which generated most of Congo's wealth. Congo's independence in 1960 and Patrice Lumumba's push for national resource control threatened Belgium's economic dominance. In response, Belgium supported Katanga's secession, claiming to protect its citizens but in reality seeking to preserve its mining interests. Moise Tshombe, Katanga's leader, shared these interests; he and his family had close ties with Western corporations and sought to retain control over Katanga's mineral resources for personal and regional gain. By declaring Katanga's independence, Tshombe ensured that he could dictate the exploitation of valuable minerals like copper and cobalt, enriching himself while aligning with Western powers. His actions deepened Congo's political divisions, weakened the central government, and drew in Cold War involvement, intensifying the instability of the Congo Crisis.

- Albert Kalonji's declaration of autonomy for South Kasai in 1960 was primarily motivated by the desire to control the region's vast diamond, gold, and agricultural wealth. Seeking to protect the economic interests of the Baluba ethnic group, Kalonji viewed autonomy as essential to ensuring that South Kasai's profits remained in local hands rather than benefiting the central government under Patrice Lumumba, which he believed had marginalized the region. His close ties with the Belgian mining company Forminière—from which he received financial benefits through diamond concessions—further strengthened his pursuit of economic self-rule. Kalonji's secession thus reflected not only ethnic or political divisions but also a strategic effort to secure economic independence, exacerbating Congo's political fragmentation. Ultimately, South Kasai's autonomy, like Katanga's secession, revealed how control over mineral wealth and foreign economic interests were central drivers of the Congo Crisis.

4.ethnic and religious tensions

- Ethnic and regional divisions, deeply rooted in Congo's colonial past, were central to the Congo Crisis. Under Belgian rule, the colony was divided into ethnically homogenous units governed by customary chiefs, creating a hybrid system that reinforced tribal identities and rivalries. Economic and political competition between groups such as the Bakongo and Bangala, intensified by colonial favoritism and land disputes, bred mistrust. The Belgians' manipulation of ethnicity, supporting certain groups like the Lulua over the Baluba to prevent elite consolidation, fueled resentment and violence, as seen in the South Kasai conflicts of 1959–1960. Similarly, migration-driven tensions in Katanga between the native Lunda-Bayeke and Baluba "strangers" culminated in ethnic violence and Katanga's 1960 secession. The proliferation of over 50 ethnically aligned political parties further fragmented national unity. Thus, the Congo Crisis was not merely a struggle for independence but the explosive result of colonial legacies of ethnic division, political manipulation, and competing regional identities

Overall,

- Economic Interests > Domestic Politics > Ethnic & Religious Nationalism
- **Economic Interests > Domestic Politics:** However, while domestic politics played a role in the Congo Crisis, economic interests were ultimately more significant in driving the conflict. These economic stakes were both domestic and international, involving not only Congolese factions but also external actors such as Belgium, which had substantial investments in the mining sector, particularly in Katanga, a region rich in copper and uranium. Belgium actively funded and supported the Katangese secession under Moise Tshombe, providing financial aid, military training, and even supplying mercenaries to secure control over the province's resources. This intervention demonstrates how economic interests motivated Belgium to exert influence far beyond the domestic political struggles of the Congo. Domestically, political instability was also intertwined with

economic motives, as the secessions of Katanga and South Kasai were primarily driven by the desire to control mineral wealth. These economically motivated breakaways exacerbated the fragile political landscape, triggering rebellions and contributing to the wider chaos, showing how economic interests affected domestic politics. Therefore, while domestic politics created conditions for unrest, it was economic interests that served as the central force shaping the Congo Crisis and intensifying divisions across the country.

- **Economic Interests > Ethnic & Religious Tensions:** Economic interests were a more direct and tangible cause of conflict in the Congo, particularly through Belgian funding and interventions aimed at safeguarding their access to valuable resources such as copper, cobalt, and rubber. Belgium invested heavily in developing infrastructure and administrative systems that would ensure continued extraction of wealth, often prioritizing economic efficiency over the welfare of the Congolese people. In contrast, ethnic and religious differences were largely artificial constructs created by the Belgians to maintain control and protect these economic interests. For example, the Belgians favored certain ethnic groups, such as the Tutsi in specific regions, for administrative roles and missionary education, while marginalizing others, thereby fostering resentment and competition. Similarly, religious divisions were accentuated by granting privileges to Catholic missions over Protestant ones, creating friction that had little basis outside colonial manipulation. By deliberately reinforcing these social divisions, Belgium ensured that the Congolese were fragmented and politically weak, making it easier to exploit the country's resources. In this way, what appeared to be ethnic or religious conflicts were in reality a byproduct of economic motives, with Belgium using social constructs as a tool to secure and protect their material interests in the Congo.
- **Domestic Politics > Ethnic & Religious Tensions:** After independence in 1960, Congolese leaders actively amplified ethnic and regional differences to consolidate their own power. Leaders such as Moise Tshombe in Katanga and Albert Kalonji in South Kasai mobilized ethnic loyalties to assert political authority, with Tshombe even attempting secession under the pretense of protecting Katangese identity. Patrice Lumumba's central government struggled to create a cohesive national identity, leaving citizens more loyal to their ethnic or regional groups than to the state. By exploiting these divisions, leaders transformed social and cultural distinctions into political tools, using ethnic and regional loyalties to gain support, strengthen their authority, and challenge rivals. In this way, domestic political ambitions directly deepened fragmentation and instability within the Congo.

<u>Actors</u>

1.dom state actors

- State actors, particularly Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, played central roles in shaping the early Congo Crisis. Lumumba, a nationalist, aimed to centralize authority and preserve national unity, while Kasa-Vubu represented conservative and federalist interests favoring regional autonomy. Their ideological and political clashes created a deadlock within the fledgling government, which escalated when Kasa-Vubu attempted to dismiss Lumumba in September 1960. Lumumba's rejection of this dismissal triggered a constitutional crisis, highlighting the fragility of Congo's post-independence governance. The inability of these state leaders to cooperate or establish a functional central government left the Congo politically unstable, creating a vacuum that both internal and external actors could exploit. Their rivalry not only weakened national unity but also intensified internal tensions, making the central state unable to assert authority over secessionist regions like Katanga and South Kasai.

2.dom non-state actors - partially economic interests

- Non-state actors, including Colonel Joseph Mobutu and Moïse Tshombe, further exacerbated the crisis by exploiting political fragmentation for personal or regional gain. Mobutu, with the backing of Western powers, intervened militarily to suspend both Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu, later handing Lumumba over to Katangan rivals, which directly led to his assassination in January 1961. Tshombe, as the leader of Katanga's secessionist movement, positioned himself in opposition to the central government to maintain regional autonomy and control over Katanga's mineral wealth. Belgian companies and allied actors also supported Katanga's secession, supplying military and economic aid to protect their economic interests. Together, these non-state actors undermined central authority, perpetuated conflict, and internationalized the crisis, turning a domestic power struggle into a prolonged and violent political crisis.

3.Superpower interests

- Superpower interests played a decisive role in the Congo Crisis, as both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened to influence the country's political future. The U.S., worried that Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba might align with the Soviet bloc, actively sought to undermine him. Conversely, the Soviet Union and China supported the pro-Lumumba "Free Republic of the Congo" as the legitimate government. The CIA bribed Congolese politicians to withdraw support from Lumumba, weakening his parliamentary control. On 1 September 1960, Kasavubu received American payments and promises of backing to challenge Lumumba's authority. The U.S. also manipulated UN operations, leading to the closure of radio stations and Stanleyville airport, isolating Lumumba from his supporters. In 1961, the USSR supplied military equipment, food, and intelligence personnel to the Gizenga government via Czechoslovakia. These interventions show that both superpowers were actively shaping internal Congolese politics rather than observing passively. Their involvement turned a domestic power struggle into a Cold War proxy conflict. As a result, superpower actions escalated the crisis and deepened political divisions, making them a key driver of the Congo Crisis.

4.belgians - economic interests

- After independence, Belgian companies and government allies supported Moïse Tshombe's **Katanga secession** to protect their economic interests. Belgium supplied military and economic aid, sending troops under the pretext of protecting nationals while propping up secessionist authorities, directly undermining the central government and perpetuating conflict. Even after formal withdrawal, Belgian businesses continued to influence Congolese politics, especially in mining. Colonial "divide and rule" policies had fostered ethnic rivalries, which were easily exploited during the crisis. Belgium's pursuit of control over Congo's mineral wealth directly fueled the crisis by backing Katanga and weakening national unity. These interventions, combined with lingering colonial divisions, made Belgium a key factor in prolonging and intensifying the Congo Crisis.

<u>Overall,</u>

- Superpower > belgians > non-state > state
- Superpower > Belgians: Although economic reason did trigger the conflict, it was the **Cold War involvement** that *changed the nature* of the crisis from local secessionist insurrection into an **international proxy battleground**, escalating the intensity and prolonging the

conflict. It also was the reason behind the resolution of the conflict. Eg USA backing of anti-communist Mobutu that seized power and ended the crisis in Nov 1965.

- Superpower > non-state: Comparing the factors, external state actors held more responsibility than domestic non-state actors for causing the Congo Crisis. The United States and the Soviet Union transformed Congo's post-independence instability into a proxy war, each backing opposing factions to extend their ideological influence. Such intervention enabled non-state actors to act with greater strength and legitimacy than they would have otherwise possessed. This was especially so as the Congo had no capital nor skilled people in the country, with there being only 16 college-educated Congolese. Additionally, it was even seen that external forces like the U.S. played an active direct role in the Congo Crisis, and not just one of passive support, like in the assassination of Lumumba, and they later ensured Mobutu's rise to power through continued funding and political support. Thus, it is seen that this sustained influence the superpowers had in the Congo's internal conflict not only intensified it, but also directly drove it, with domestic non-state leaders only being able to play the role it had due to the external powers' support.
- Superpower > state: they directly attacked their rule, turning it into a proxy war
- Belgians > non-state/state: Comparing the two factors, domestic POLITICAL interests ultimately played a larger role in shaping the Congo Crisis than economic interests. At the start of the crisis, economic motives such as Belgium's desire to protect its mining interests in Katanga were dominant, explaining its early military support for Tshombe's secession. However, by 1962–63, this economic motivation waned as Belgium faced growing domestic criticism and international pressure, while Congolese leaders like Mobutu and Kasavubu became increasingly driven by the need to consolidate internal political authority. In contrast, domestic political interests in Congo continued to intensify over time. These domestic pressures enabled the UN to act decisively, culminating in Katanga's forced reintegration in 1963, showing that economic interests faded while domestic political goals remained central. Thus, although economic interests shaped the early phase of the crisis, it was domestic interests that ultimately determined its direction and resolution.
- Non-state > state: Comparing the factors, domestic non-state actors held more responsibility than domestic state actors for causing the Congo Crisis. Throughout the Crisis, the Congo state was extremely fragmented, with the Congolese leaders being more engrossed in infighting, unable to act decisively, and thus became vulnerable to external threats. The mutual dismissal of Kasavubu and Lumumba in September 1960 effectively paralysed the central government, leaving the country without effective leadership. This power vacuum rendered the state unable to contain the mutiny of the national army or respond effectively to the Katanga secession led by Moïse Tshombe. Backed by Belgian interests, Tshombe's secessionist movement further weakened the state's authority. Meanwhile, army chief Joseph Mobutu, capitalised on the chaos, with his position strengthened by covert U.S. funding. His subsequent coup in September 1960 marked a turning point where even non-state could overtake the government, effectively showing how powerless the state was to non-state forces. Even later, Kasavubu's decision to appoint Tshombe as Prime Minister showed how powerless the state had become, giving legitimacy and relying on non-state actors's power to restore control. Even later on, the state still continued its infighting, now between Kasavubu and Tshombe, which further

destabilised the country, enabling Mobutu a non-state actor to once again exploit the turmoil and seize power with foreign backing in 1965.

Conflict mgmt

1.UN via ONUC and diplomatic efforts

- **Success:** United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), one of the UN's most extensive and ambitious peacekeeping missions. Following Congo's independence in 1960, the UN was called upon to assist the fragile new government in restoring order amidst escalating political chaos and foreign interference. ONUC's primary objective was to maintain the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and prevent the crisis from destabilising the broader African region. Under the calm and principled leadership of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN projected an image of neutrality and legitimacy, refusing to succumb to either Soviet demands to halt action against the Katangese secession or to President Kennedy's request to block Antoine Gizenga's political participation. This diplomatic restraint reinforced the UN's credibility as a neutral peacekeeping force. Militarily, ONUC succeeded in suppressing the Katangan secession by 1963, with its troops, through operations such as the Battle of Jadotville, successfully reintegrating Katanga into the Congo. Thus, the combination of firm yet impartial leadership and effective peacekeeping operations ensured that the Congo Crisis was contained domestically, preventing its escalation into a broader Cold War confrontation in Africa..
- **Failure:** ONUC was criticized for being too reactive rather than proactive. The mission's focus was often on containing violence, rather than fostering a durable political process or promoting long-term peace. Although it prevented the secession of Katanga, it did not have the mandate or the capacity to support the creation of a functioning, inclusive government that could address the broader political crises facing the country. The continued military and political instability after ONUC's withdrawal in 1964 highlighted its limited success in addressing the core causes of the conflict.

2.External Powers (FAILURE)

- both the United States and the Soviet Union intervened to influence the country's political future. The U.S., worried that Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba might align with the Soviet bloc, actively sought to undermine him. Conversely, the Soviet Union and China supported the pro-Lumumba "Free Republic of the Congo" as the legitimate government. The CIA bribed Congolese politicians to withdraw support from Lumumba, weakening his parliamentary control. On 1 September 1960, Kasavubu received American payments and promises of backing to challenge Lumumba's authority. The U.S. also manipulated UN operations, leading to the closure of radio stations and Stanleyville airport, isolating Lumumba from his supporters. In 1961, the USSR supplied military equipment, food, and intelligence personnel to the Gizenga government via Czechoslovakia. These interventions show that both superpowers were actively shaping internal Congolese politics rather than observing passively. Their involvement turned a domestic power struggle into a Cold War proxy conflict. As a result, superpower actions escalated the crisis and deepened political divisions, hampering efforts to manage the Congo Crisis.

3.Root Cause [FAILURE]

- The crisis was not merely a military struggle but a contest over the political future of the Congo and the distribution of power. The legacy of Belgian colonial rule had left the country with a weak administrative system and deep ethnic divisions, which fuelled tensions after independence. Ethnic groups, particularly in Katanga, resisted the authority of the central government, which they viewed as ineffective and dominated by foreign influence. The Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) was divided by ideological and regional rivalries, splitting into the moderate MNC-Lumumba (MNC-L) under Patrice Lumumba, which supported a centralised state, and the more federalist MNC-Kalonji. Its alliance with ABAKO was also fragile, as ABAKO promoted ethnic and territorial nationalism, contrasting with the MNC's vision of unity. These divisions culminated in a constitutional crisis in September 1960 between Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu, while Tshombe's Katanga declared independence with Belgian backing. Such political fragmentation and competing regional interests weakened national cohesion and prevented the UN from establishing lasting stability in the Congo.

Overall,

- **Superpower > UN:** Although the UN initially appeared to act as a neutral peacekeeping body, the superpowers' manipulation of Security Council resolutions demonstrated their ability to constrain the UN's independence. The Soviet Union, angered by Patrice Lumumba's overthrow and assassination, condemned the UN as a tool of Western imperialism and attempted to block further UN resolutions that legitimised Western-backed governments in Congo. Conversely, the United States used its influence to water down or veto Soviet-backed resolutions calling for direct intervention to restore Lumumba's government, ensuring that ONUC did not act against Mobutu or Belgian-supported Katangese forces . These divisions paralysed the Security Council. Hammarskjöld's proposals for stronger UN action were blocked or diluted due to Cold War rivalries, preventing ONUC from addressing the root causes of the crisis or taking decisive action against foreign interference. Thus, while the UN strove for impartial conflict management, superpower rivalry rendered it ineffective, and ending in failure.
- **Root Cause > UN:** While ONUC succeeded in containing immediate violence and reintegrating Katanga, it failed to resolve the underlying divisions within Congolese politics and society. The absence of a coherent national political strategy left the population excluded from meaningful participation, while rival factions among the political elite prevented the formation of a unified government. Diplomatic efforts such as the Lusaka Agreement, which sought to reconcile the central government and Katangan secessionists, collapsed due to foreign interference and the unwillingness of both sides to compromise due to underlying issues remaining unaddressed. ONUC's limited mandate focused on maintaining The crisis was not merely a military struggle but a contest over the political future of the Congo and the distribution of power. The legacy of Belgian colonial rule had left the country with a weak administrative system and deep ethnic divisions, which fuelled tensions after independence. Ethnic groups, particularly in Katanga, resisted the authority of the central government, which they viewed as ineffective and dominated by foreign influence. The Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) was divided by ideological and regional rivalries, splitting into the moderate MNC-Lumumba (MNC-L) under Patrice Lumumba, which supported a centralised state, and the more federalist MNC-Kalonji. Its alliance with ABAKO was also fragile, as ABAKO promoted ethnic and territorial nationalism, contrasting with the MNC's vision of unity. These divisions culminated in a constitutional crisis in September 1960 between Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu, while Tshombe's Katanga declared independence with Belgian backing. Such political fragmentation and competing regional interests weakened national cohesion and

prevented the UN from establishing lasting stability in the Congo.peace rather than building political institutions, and when the mission ended, Congo remained unstable and fragmented. As a result, when the mission ended, the country was left with an unstable and disjointed political system that could not prevent the rise of Mobutu's dictatorship in 1965. Mobutu, despite his authoritarian rule, was supported by the West as a stable anti-communist leader, but his policies further entrenched the country's problems, including economic mismanagement and political repression. Thus, despite temporary successes, the UN's failure to address the root political causes ensured that long-term peace and stability in the Congo were never achieved, with efforts thus ending in failure.

No China nor Bosnia so if they come out this year again ggs